Published biannually and with a permanently open call for papers, is edited by the Department of Philosophy of the University of Santiago de Chile. The journal is destined to the publication of manuscripts oriented towards sciences and technologies, be they old, modern, or contemporary. We publish articles that contribute to the discussion about sciences, techniques and technologies from sociological, philosophical, political, epistemological, historical, logical, economic, legal, didactic, anthropological, and ethical perspectives.
Facultad de Humanidades. Universidad de Santiago de Chile
The Heuristic Power of Theory Classification, the Case of General Relativity
In this article, we explore the heuristic power of the theoretical distinction between structural and mechanistic theories applied to the case of General Relativity. According to the distinction, theories and theoretical elements can be classified into two different groups, each with clear ontological, epistemic and functional content. Being so, to identify the group to which a theory belongs would suffice to know a priori its prospects and limitations in these areas without going into a detailed technical analysis. We make the exercise here with General Relativity, anticipate its ontological, epistemic and functional content and show afterwords that such expectations are justified in this case, being consistent with formal issues of General Relativity. With this, we attempt to make a case for the use of the distinction as a powerful tool for scientific and philosophical analysis.
Dossier: Philosophy and Foundations of Physics
Copyright (c) 2026 Diego Maltrana, Nicolás Sepúlveda-Quiroz http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
The contributions of history and philosophy to improve the teaching of Physics
Should we consider the history and philosophy of physics as basic pillars for teaching and understanding science, or are they simply "lateral" knowledge that is dispensable for teachers? Can physics be taught without knowing its history and without resorting to epistemology? Let's briefly reflect on the "traditional" way of teaching science: content is generally taught as finished products, not as the result of a process. Understanding what science is and how it is constructed, requires analyzing some historical cases of how theories were developed. In this brief essay, we will consider why we consider the use of history and epistemology to be central in the science classroom.
Copyright (c) 2026 Vicente Menéndez http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Bohmian mechanics and explanation: the case of the interpretation of the wave function
In this article, we address the question of whether Bohmian mechanics provides a scientific explanation of phenomena and whether its explanatory power depends on the chosen interpretation of the theory. More particularly, we focus on the debate concerning the nature of the wave function, considering three interpretations: (i) that it represents a physical field; (ii) that it is an aspect of the particles’ law of motion; and (iii) that it represents a dispositional property of the particles. In a recent paper, Esfeld et al. (2014) consider these three alternatives, arguing that the dispositional interpretation is superior in explanatory terms. For our analysis, we use Díez’s (2014), according to which scientific explanations are instances of ampliative and specialized nomological embeddings. We conclude that Bohmian mechanics is explanatory and that its capacity to provide an adequate scientific explanation of phenomena does not depend on the interpretation of the theory, clarifying how alleged differences in explanatory power, such as those invoked by Esfeld et al. (2014), should be understood.
Copyright (c) 2026 Albert Solé, José A. Díez http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
The presentation of elementary thermodynamics for engineering students using microscopic models based on classical mechanics is discussed. It is argued that it is a first approximation to the microscopic structure of matter and a good application of the classical mechanics of particle systems. The model of classical particles is used to deduce the state equation of an ideal gas, understand the pressure and relate the absolute temperature with the mean kinetic energy per molecule. The theorems of work and mechanical energy are used to understand the thermodynamic concepts of internal energy, heat and work, and to reobtain the first principle of thermodynamics. The entropy is presented as a function proportional to the logarithm of the enormous number of possible microstates for a given macroscopic state. Starting from this definition and postulating the increasing of entropy when the system evolve towards equilibrium the usual presentation of the second principle is reobtained.
Copyright (c) 2026 Roberto Laura http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
General-relativistic Spacetimes Are Not (so) Special
The invariance under diffeomorphisms of general relativity is a formal property of the theory that is not present in other theories. Some authors, closely related to research in quantum gravity, have argued that this symmetry means that spacetime in general relativity cannot be interpreted like other spacetimes. More specifically, spacetime would be only a structure for representing “correlations.” This position is supported by three arguments: the gauge argument, relationalist arguments such as the hole argument, and the relationship with quantum gravity. In this article, I study this position and these arguments and reject them. The position I defend is that invariance under diffeomorphisms does not make the spacetimes of general relativity different in any deep sense, and that they should be interpreted analogously to other spacetimes. More precisely, spacetime, both in general relativity and other theories, is a set of events with a series of causal, geometric, and inertial relations.
Copyright (c) 2026 Álvaro Mozota http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Philosophy and Foundations of Physics in Spanish: Accessibility and Linguistic Plurality
Editorial of the dossier “Philosophy and Foundations of Physics” Philosophy and Foundations of Physics in Spanish: Accessibility and Linguistic Plurality
Copyright (c) 2026 Sebastian Fortin, Matías Daniel Pasqualini http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
The principle of composition and decomposition of properties in modal interpretations of quantum mechanics
Modal interpretations of quantum mechanics were developed in the 1980s with the aim of explaining quantum measurement without invoking a collapse of the wave function. One of the key factors that influenced the evolution of these interpretations was their compliance with the principle of composition and decomposition of properties, which establishes the correspondence between the properties of composite systems and those of their subsystems. In several of the earliest modal interpretations, however, this principle is not satisfied. This limitation motivated the development of alternative versions designed to overcome such inadequacy, among them the modal-Hamiltonian interpretation. In this article, we examine the precise sense in which the principle of composition and decomposition of properties fails in certain modal interpretations and how this problem is resolved in others. We also explore whether the restrictions imposed by the modal-Hamiltonian interpretation on its actualization rule can be relaxed without compromising its consistency with the principle.
Copyright (c) 2025 Matías Pasqualini http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Probabilities as propensities in quantum mechanics
The aim of this paper is to explore the problem of probabilities in quantum mechanics and how the concept of propensity has resurfaced in certain realist interpretations of this theory. Suárez (2007), Dorato and Esfeld (2010), and Lombardi and Castagnino (2008) have all defended the idea of considering probabilities as objective probabilities of the physical world, articulating them in terms of propensities. In this paper, we will seek to elucidate, firstly, what characterizes the positions that defend propensities as the most appropriate way to interpret probabilities in quantum mechanics; secondly, to specify the extent to which the various competing positions differ from one another; and finally, to defend the thesis put forward by both Lombardi and Castagnino (2008) and da Costa, Lombardi, and Lastiri (2013) that propensities are the best way to understand the role of probabilities in the quantum world. Within a property ontology such as that proposed by the Modal-Hamiltonian interpretation, propensities constitute second-order type-propensities that determine the tendency of said properties to be actualized in a preferred context of actualization.
Copyright (c) 2025 Ignacio Rojas Herrera http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
The Modal-Hamiltonian Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and the Measurement Problem
This paper presents the Modal-Hamiltonian Interpretation (MHI) of quantum mechanics and shows how it provides a conceptually consistent and physically plausible solution to the measurement problem. By assigning a central role to the system's Hamiltonian and its symmetries in determining the observables that acquire definite values, the MHI avoids the difficulties faced by other interpretations when dealing with non-ideal measurements. Its update rule ensures that the measurement pointer always acquires a definite value and allows one to distinguish between reliable and unreliable frequency measurements. Furthermore, the MHI proposes a physical model that complements von Neumann's formal approach, conceiving measurement as a symmetry-breaking process through which previously inaccessible generators of the Hamiltonian become empirically accessible.
Copyright (c) 2025 Olimpia Lombardi http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Quantum Panprotopsychism and the Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics
Given the multiplicity of interpretations of quantum mechanics that give rise to very different ontologies, it is worth asking whether it is possible to find criteria with some empirical basis that make some interpretations preferable to others. If empirical evidence were found for the existence of quantum systems in the brain such as those necessary to adopt a form of panpsychism that resolves the problems of combination of subjects, qualities, and structures recognized since the time of William James, their underlying ontologies would be favored by allowing us to account for our conscious experiences. Quantum panprotopsychism has proven particularly well-suited to addressing the combination problems of panpsychism. It is based on an ontology of states and events with clearly identified physical and phenomenal counterparts and would therefore be recognizable if these physical elements were part of brain function.. Such an ontology could provide criteria for preferring certain quantum interpretations over others. Here we will analyze the interpretations that would be favored or challenged by the ontology resulting from this form of panprotopsychism.
Copyright (c) 2025 Rodolfo Gambini http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Superdeterminism and the Idols of the Forum and the Theater
In recent years there has been marked interest in so-called superdeterminism: the idea of evading Bell’s theorem and its consequences by denying the assumption of Settings Independence (SI). I argue that much of it is misdirected, resting on clear and well-documented misunderstandings that a straightforward review of the dispute and relevant literature would readily dispel. As a possible explanation for the growing interest in superdeterminism despite these misunderstandings, I point to a tendency among some philosophers of science to defer excessively to physicists’ conclusions and opinions. Finally, I argue that if philosophy of physics is to be useful to physics and to science more broadly—by offering conceptual clarity, identifying problems, providing constructive criticism, and guiding theory choice—it must avoid such complacency.
Copyright (c) 2026 C. Gerardo S. Ciepielewski http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
The plural form of empirical adequacy in physics
In the context of philosophy of physics, it is possible to identify some fundamental problems that, in their formulation, explicitly appeal to the concept of empirical adequacy. Although at first glance it might seem that these problems share the same canonical characterization of this concept, a deeper philosophical analysis shows that the anatomy of the latter depends on assumptions about what is observable or detectable, so it cannot be uniquely defined. In fact, given that what is considered observable o detectable depends on the theory and the philosophical position adopted with respect to it, the very definition of empirical adequacy implies not only that theory but also the position in question. Under these circumstances, the aim of this contribution is to develop a plural characterization of empirical adequacy relative to the spectrum of different philosophical commitments associated with the realism-antirealism debate. Based on this characterization, I shall demonstrate that some fundamental problems addressed within philosophy of physics can only be formulated and make sense through the lens of different particular notions of empirical adequacy, aligned with the spectrum of philosophies that emerge from this debate.
Copyright (c) 2025 Jorge Manero http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
What does “reversing time” mean in physics?
This article examines the concept of time reversal in physics. I argue that the complexity of time reversal arises from two distinct levels that play a fundamental role in its conceptualization and implementation: a metaphysical level and a heuristic–methodological level. Different positions adopted at each of these levels guide, and to some extent determine, how time reversal is to be understood. The outcome is not only a significant conceptual complexity in clarifying what it means to reverse time in physics, but also a degree of underdetermination in the range of possible answers.
Copyright (c) 2025 Cristian Lopez http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Elemer Nemesszeghy, S. J.: An early importer of mathematical logic to Chile
Elemer Nemesszeghy, S. J. (1925-2007), a Hungarian philosopher living in Chile between 1956 and 1971, taught Mathematical logic for fifteen years in a country that lacked a local tradition in the field. Despite of his contributions, his figure has been omitted by both the historiography of logic and Chilean intellectual history. This article seeks to reconstruct Nemesszeghy's philosophical and logical trajectory and to characterize his work from a historical-philosophical point of view. To this end, it analyzes his intellectual formation within the framework of the Central European neo-scholastic tradition, his links with the Lwów–Warsaw school and the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie of Louvain, and his institutional contributions to the Catholic University of Valparaíso, including his role in the foundation of the Institute of Mathematics. The article examines in detail his academic production, both solo and co-authored. From these texts, the technical and philosophical character of his production, its critical reception and its theoretical limitations are evaluated. It is argued that, although his work was neither propositional nor original in a strong sense, it constitutes a significant contribution to logical education in Chile and an early example of local appropriation of Mathematical logic. Finally, the structural and historiographical reasons that explain the relative oblivion of his figure are discussed, placing his legacy in the broader framework of the intellectual history of the formal sciences in the country
Copyright (c) 2025 Gabriel Donoso Umaña, Esteban Echaniz http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
No-go theorems in the foundations of quantum mechanics
The predictive power of quantum mechanics is virtually unmatched. However, there is no clarity—let alone consensus—about what the theory tells us about the nature of the world. This grand question has generated passionate debates over time; the problem is that these debates have often been conducted with little rigor or conceptual precision. No‑go theorems in the foundations of quantum mechanics offer a solid theoretical framework for addressing these questions in a more systematic and objective manner. The purpose of this manuscript is to examine a select set of these results, consisting of the EPR argument, Bell’s theorem, the Kochen‑Specker theorem, Maudlin’s trilemma and the PBR theorem. The goal is to provide a framework for exploring conceptual questions in quantum mechanics in a more rigorous and precise manner.
Copyright (c) 2025 Elias Okon http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Addressing McKenzie’s Challenge Regarding Progress in Naturalized Metaphysics
In this article, I elaborate a proposal to overcome McKenzie’s argument against the possibility of progress-talk in metaphysics (2020). McKenzie states that said discourse is not possible in metaphysics due to its “all-or-nothing” character: either metaphysical theories are true or not, without intermediaries, so the language of approximation cannot meaningfully apply to changes between metaphysical theories. I show that discussions regarding the type of metaphysical relationship between two relata are susceptible to retention and refinement, two criteria that McKenzie considers necessary for progress, as long as they tend towards better matching what is observable in reality. This is possible if metaphysical relationship types are characterized as sets of properties, from which the Jaccard Index between two sets can be utilised to determine the degree of similarity or approximation between relationship types. If such is the case, then a transition from one relationship thesis to another can be considered progress as long as some properties are retained and the change is guided by empirical evidence. Hence, progress-talk in naturalized metaphysics is possible according to McKenzie’s own criteria.
Copyright (c) 2025 Javier Silva Silva http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Does Cognitive Ethology entail a commitment to anthropomorphism?
The development of Cognitive Ethology has given rise, since its beginnings, to a series of debates about the possible anthropomorphism that could be implied in theorizations about the animal mind. However, if one examines carefully the way in which contemporary studies on animal cognition are actually formulated, designed and developed, one notices that this concern is, to a large extent, impertinent or at least exaggerated. Moreover, it can be concluded that this concern has often been motivated more by a deficient or misleading understanding of the concept of the mental, than by aspects inherent to the concrete way in which such research is carried out. In this sense, if one adopts the conception of mental predicates formulated by Gilbert Ryle, and keeps in focus the way in which these predicates are effectively used in empirical studies on animal cognition, anthropomorphism can be considered as a legitimate heuristic resource, always subject to objective controls. In fact, if there is a relevant obstacle in these investigations, it lies less in anthropomorphism than in an anthropocentric bias. The articulation between cognitive parsimony, proposed by Morgans Canon, and evolutionary parsimony define the royal road to circumvent this bias.
Copyright (c) 2025 Gustavo Caponi http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Editorial Journal Scientific Cultures, vol. 5, 2024.
Copyright (c) 2024 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Bridging the Gap: Holton's Themata and their Nexus with Established Philosophical Frameworks in Scientific Research
This article examines the rich texture of Holton's themata. Holton argues that within established rational norms there is room for subjective elements, including scientific imagination. He posits that these peer influences, known as themeta, not only fail to impede scientific progress, but also serve as a conduit for new scientific discoveries. The paper aims to gain a comprehensive understanding of their impact on academics and scientific research, by investigating their potential convergence or divergence with other cognitive frameworks in the philosophy of science, such as Kant's categories, Kuhn's paradigms and Lakatos' research programmes. By comparing themeta to these well-established frameworks commonly used to unravel scientific knowledge and research, this study aims to clear up potential confusion and deepen our understanding of the often overlooked or underestimated influence exerted by themeta in science. In a specific sense, this investigation highlights the vital role played by imagination and pre-existing thought structures in the formulation and advancement of scientific theories. Through this analysis, a comprehensive understanding of the essence of themata is provided, highlighting the importance of recognising and understanding themata as essential components of scientific research at certain point. As a result, this investigation reinforces the validity of the assertion, an ongoing subject of debate, that empirical data, mathematical expertise or logical reasoning alone cannot supplant these integral constituents.
Copyright (c) 2024 Georges ALAHOU http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
The Problem of Biological Individuality in Medicine.
The relevance of studying biological individual differences in relation to health has been progressively increasing, with the current rise of personalized medicine serving as a prime example. In this field, the unique set of characteristics in each individual patient forms the basis for personalized diagnoses and treatments. The objective of this work is to analyze and define the issue of biological individuality in medicine. Biological individuality pertains to the biological uniqueness of every human individual and its impact on clinical decision-making. The qualities of patients being biologically unique in a way that pertains to medicine, with implications for the assessment and clinical decision-making concerning an individual's health status, will be examined in relation to general medical categories. This examination will primarily focus on evidence-based medicine, randomized clinical trials, and the establishment of reference values in clinical laboratories. It will be argued that the issue of biological individuality in relation to general health categories is fundamentally an epistemological problem related to the external validation of clinical evidence. Additionally, we will explore how the individualization of medicine, with personalized medicine as its current paradigm, represents an attempt to address the previously mentioned issue of biological individuality. Nevertheless, in this context, challenges of both epistemological and metaphysical natures arise, with the latter being associated with the definition of health and disease.
Copyright (c) 2024 Fiorela Alassia http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
A Philosophical Defence of Mainstream Economic Theory
This paper will be a defence of mainstream economics. I will take the criticisms of Muñoz Ferrer (2021), who tries to show the dangers of market economics by criticising mainstream economic theory. Muñoz Ferrer's criticisms will allow me to point out some commonly misunderstood aspects of mainstream economic theory that are based on a misunderstanding of the development of economic thought, which leads to a misconception of what mainstream economics is about and its scope. I will begin with a brief history of the discipline, starting with the marginalist revolution, the origin of "subjectivity understood as the mere pursuit of individual interest" (ibid., p.66), or a false psychology as Muñoz Ferrer also calls it. I will then explain how, from the ordinalist revolution onwards, economics begins to separate from psychology. This will allow me to show that positions, such as Muñoz Ferrer's, falsely presuppose that economics seeks to be some kind of psychology. Finally, my argument will show the epistemic value of models in economics and that, even within the very practice of economists, there are not the problems that their critics attribute to them.
Copyright (c) 2025 Martín Adolfo Barra-Acuña http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
In this paper, I propose a possible anti-realist solution to the paradox of explanation. This proposal is in line with the instrumentalist position of Reiss (2012b, 2013) but goes further: a normative inferentialist position of explanation is proposed. First, I will show some fundamental aspects of inferentialism in the context of explanation, and then, I will show how an inferentialist position regarding paradox of explanation reduces to accepting the following three propositions: 1. models are true in the sense of true explanations, 2. models explain, and 3. only true explanations explain. This expresses a solution to the paradox insofar as it is perfectly possible to accept each of the three propositions.
Copyright (c) 2024 Felipe Núñez Michea http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Extra Epistemic Values in the Sciences. Is it possible to sustain the ideal of value-free science today?
This work addresses the ideal of science free of extra epistemic values. In this regard, the discussion is situated within the framework of authors who subscribe to the so-called scientific pluralism, who, in general, have a position more inclined to accept the influence of extra-epistemic values in the sciences, such as moral, political and social values. In particular, the positions of Helen Lóngino, Heather Douglas and John Dupré are reviewed, analyzing whether or not the criticisms developed mainly by Hugh Lacey are applicable, who, being a pluralist, continues to support the ideal of value-free science. It is concluded that there are good arguments that support the influence of extra epistemic values in the sciences; However, its extension may be subject to debate or nuanced. In this regard, a position is taken based on the position of John Dupré, which recognizes that in certain areas of science- such as particle physics- there is no extra epistemic burden. Likewise, it is concluded that, although the ideal of a completely value-free science must be rejected, its dimension as a regulative ideal may have some relevance, imposing a greater challenge for positions that seek to refute the ideal in question.
Copyright (c) 2024 Paulo Javier Olivares Díaz http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
The position of atomic particles in the foundational papers of Quantum Mechanics, 1925-1927
We present an introductory study of the role of the particle concept in the foundational papers of quantum mechanics. We focus on the period, 1925-1927, which includes the analysis of the first papers by Heisenberg, Born, Jordan, Schrödinger and Dirac, and also the first formulation of Bohr's complementarity. Our aim is to discuss to what extent the concept of particle was questioned among the creators of the new theory, just at the time of its creation and when there was still no agreed or established interpretation. Subsequent developments, such as quantum field theory, put the validity of this concept under suspicion. We show that a historiographical analysis articulated by means of this concept makes it possible to characterize the relationship that the different authors of quantum mechanics maintained with the visualization of atomic processes. In some cases, such as that of Heisenberg, their evolution is particularly significant. Likewise, we will also quote some fragments where the authors considered claim for themselves the legacy of the old quantum theory, trying to legitimize their own developments on the basis of their coherence with the first discoveries of Planck, Einstein or De Broglie. From practically all of them we have found texts in this sense.
Copyright (c) 2023 Enric Pérez Canals http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Una ontología modal de relaciones para la mecánica cuántica
In correspondence with the modal interpretations of quantum mechanics, Lombardi and Castagnino (2008) and da Costa, Lombardi and Lastiri (2013) have proposed an ontology of bundles of possible intrinsic properties for quantum mechanics, focused mainly on the issues of quantum contextuality and indistinguishability. Corresponding to the interpretation known as "relational quantum mechanics" (Rovelli, 1996), two ontologies based on relations have been proposed. Laura Candiotto (2017) advocates for a radical metaphysics of relations, considered by the author as an instance of the so-called "ontic structural realism". Alternatively, Andrea Oldofredi (2021) proposes an ontology of bundles of relations, considered by the author as an instance of the so-called "moderate structural realism". Since the 1980s, the topic of quantum entanglement has led several authors (Teller, Healey, Howard, Esfeld) to defend that quantum mechanics involves a form of holism. It has been argued that the holism of quantum mechanics supports the metaphysical thesis known as "priority monism" (Schaffer, 2010a). In this article, an ontology of quantum mechanics is proposed in which the properties of quantum systems have both a modal and a relational character. As a result, a holistic ontology of quantum mechanics is obtained, which is an instance of priority monism and moderate structural realism.
Copyright (c) 2023 Matias Daniel Pasqualini
Undesirable conclusions in the sciences: a pluralistic perspective
The present work seeks to address, within the context of the debate around the influence of extra-epistemic values in the sciences, the problem regarding certain scientific investigations that could contain undesirable conclusions, in the sense that their content could affect certain social groups. Following the reasoning of the pluralist philosopher Philip Kitcher, the discussion is situated around the renunciation of the search for certain truths, when these may conflict with certain moral, political or social values that we are not willing to transgress. In this line, emphasis is placed on the influence of moral considerations that can influence our judgment about the truths that describe the world, as well as on the moral dimension of human action that turns out to be an inalienable aspect, which is entirely applicable to scientific activity.
Copyright (c) 2023 Paulo Javier Olivares Díaz http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Encyclopedic spirit and technical mentality
This work aims to provide some elements for a reflection on the industrialization processes in the province of Catamarca - Argentina in the second half of the nineteenth century. To orient ourselves in this direction, we will start from the project of a genetic encyclopedia proposed by the philosopher Gilbert Simondon as a proposed approach. Then we will analyze the encyclopedic spirit present in the economic writings of Federico Schickendantz and Samuel Lafone Quevedo structured as teaching machines. Finally, we will present the description of two technical objects created by D. Mardoqueo Molina y Bazán elaborated in these writings. We consider that these technical objects provided a paradigm of intelligibility for the construction of certain images of the future of industrial activity in the province of Catamarca in these writings. From our perspective, the lack of a metastable state at the social level, necessary to amplify these images of the future, prevented the development of a technical mentality.
Copyright (c) 2023 Hector Ariel Feruglio Ortiz
Editorial in memoriam: Carlo Apablaza Ávila
Copyright (c) 2023 Wilfredo Quezada Pulido, Dr.
Aristotelianism and Functional Natural Laws
Let “Aristotelianism” be the thesis that necessarily all universals are necessarily instantiated in some object or objects. Many Aristotelians have sustained that natural laws are nomological relations between universals instead of a mere regularity of events. There seem to be cases, though, in which there are natural laws but connecting universals that are not instantiated. Our intuitions about natural laws as nomological relations between universals, then, seem to undercut Aristotelianism. One strategy adopted by Aristotelians has been to suppose that in those cases there are functional laws that ground counterfactual facts about non-instantiated universals. They are not cases where some universal exists although it is not instantiated, but cases about what would have happened if some universals that do not exist, had existed. A functional law is a law that connects directly determinable properties instead of determinate properties. It is argued here that this Aristotelian strategy is incoherent. Aristotelianism requires determinable properties to be grounded on determinate properties, but the strategy requires a relation of grounding in the inverse direction.
Copyright (c) 2018 José Tomás Alvarado Marambio
Metaphisical monism and taxonomic pluralism
I argue against the Marc Ereshefsky’s interpretation according to which Willi Hennig is committed to metaphysical pluralism in his theory of phylogenetic systematics although from the taxonomic point of view he is a monist. I claim that the correct thesis is just the opposite. Hennig is a metaphysical monist but a taxonomic pluralist, since he argued that there is only one correct system of causal relations between the states of an individual organism, the genealogical relations between those individuals, and the phylogenetic relationships among species that are also conceived as individuals from an ontological viewpoint. According to Hennig, even though a plurality of classifications are possible on the basis of relations of similarity among characters, the categories related to these classifications are abstractions and they lack of individuality and reality.
Copyright (c) 2018 Julio Torres Meléndez